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The Role of HR in Corporate Governance 
 
 
  The recent corporate scandals have shed increasing light on the inability of current 
governance systems to adequately monitor and control top executive behavior. Executives at 
companies such as Enron, Worldcom, Adelphi, Qwest, Tyco, Arthur Andersen, and K-Mart 
seemingly engaged in unethical and even illegal decision making that lined their own pockets 
while leaving shareholders holding the bill.1   The results have been undeniable.  The stock 
market, which relies on trust in order to work efficiently, has floundered for over a year, in spite 
of an economy whose fundamentals are relatively strong.  Employee trust in top management 
has eroded to a point almost unheard of since the great depression.  Finally, recent polling data 
suggests that the public at large has become disenchanted with corporate executives. In fact, a 
poll by Harris Interactive found that 68% of those surveyed believe that corporate executives are 
less honest and trustworthy than they were 10 years ago, compared to only 14 % who believe 
they are more trustworthy (The Harris Poll, 2002). Hart-Teeter polls reveal that the percentage 
of Americans who have confidence in large corporations has declined to 12% in July of 2002 
from 26% in January of 2000, and the percentage who do not have confidence in large 
corporations has increased to 49% from 30% during the same period (Hart Teeter, 2002). 
Clearly, these scandals have resulted in a crisis of trust. 
At least in part, some have attributed the cause of scandals to a failure of senior 
members of the HR function to play a leadership role in governance.  This absence of HR 
influence may have been due to HR not being integral enough a part of the senior management 
team to be aware that such illegal or unethical decisions and behavior were taking place.  This 
is certainly a possibility. However, a recent gathering of HR executives organized by the Center 
for Advanced HR Studies (CAHRS) revealed that in some cases HR may have been remiss in 
                                                 
1
 I do not mean to imply that these executives were actually guilty of either unethical or illegal behavior. However, one 
cannot ignore that numerous accusations have been made against these individuals, that true or false, have resulted 
in this crisis of trust.  Consequently, throughout this paper I will use these examples because of the accusations, 
while acknowledging that some, many, or all of the executives may have been completely innocent. 




creating systems and controls to discourage such actions, and perhaps even when HR 
executives are aware of such behavior, they may not act.  The question is why not?  Senior HR 
leaders possess a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders and a moral responsibility to 
employees and it is necessary to examine how to effectively fulfill these responsibilities. 
 The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential underlying causes behind the 
current crisis of trust.  In it I will examine some of the major theories on what has caused the 
scandalous behavior of a few top executives. Within the context of each, I will examine some of 
the solutions that have been offered from the standpoint of HR leaders actions.  More 
importantly, I will raise some of the deeper challenges of which HR leaders need to be aware, 
and ones that are both critical to solving the crisis of trust, while being extremely risky for HR 
leaders to bring up. 
Theories on the “Cause” of the Current Crisis of Trust 
 A number of potential causes for the unethical and illegal behavior of corporate 
executives have been suggested. First, many have attributed these problems to “a few bad 
apples,” in essence arguing that (a) the problem is not endemic to corporate executives and (b) 
that the incentives, controls and system worked well, but a few excessively shrewd and immoral 
individuals found ways to behave unethically. In essence, this theory is that the “competencies” 
of leaders (i.e., dishonesty) led to scandal. Second, some have argued that spiraling executive 
pay forms the foundation of the current crisis. This “incentive” argument suggests that immense 
amounts of pay tied to certain financial indicators (in particular, stock options) provide the 
incentive for executives to manipulate financial reports in order to “cash in.” Third, the “controls” 
argument posits a lack of adequate corporate controls, primarily through board oversight and 
outside auditors, resulted in dysfunctional executive behavior.  Finally, some have attributed the 
problem to “the system.”  When executives are judged by shareholders based on stock prices, 
and analysts play an integral role in setting those stock prices, executives have incentives to 
court, deceive, and/or control the analysts.    




 In response to these suggested causes of the crisis, the larger business and regulatory 
communities have offered solutions in 4 basic areas: Selection of leaders, design of incentives, 
structuring of control systems (particularly Boards of Directors), and fixing the dysfunctional 
“system.”  Interestingly, each of these areas are ones in which, at least with the rest of the 
organization, HR is seen as possessing core competence and responsibility, or at least a 
deeper knowledge of human behavior that might inform the discussion.  In this chapter I hope to 
raise some of the issues that HR leaders must grapple with if they want to contribute the fixing 
the problem. Many of these issues present positive opportunities for HR leaders to proactively 
add value in ways that will be admired by their line peers. However, many of them are fraught 
with challenges that will require significant credibility, and more importantly courage, because 
the can easily result in dismissal.    
The Competencies Theory: Bad Apples 
 Probably one of the most often offered defenses of the current state of corporate 
America is that the problem stems from a few “bad apples,” or individuals who manipulated the 
system to benefit themselves.  The argument goes that most executives are honest, upright, 
and of the highest integrity, and people like Jeffrey Skilling (Enron), Dennis Kozlowski (Tyco), 
Bernie Ebbers (WorldCom) and the Rigas family (Adelphi) simply slipped through the system, 
achieve positions of power, and then exploited their companies to enrich themselves.   
Such a cause becomes readily apparent when considering how HR leaders seek to 
solve the problem.  In an informal set of interviews I conducted with a number of senior HR 
leaders who are part of the senior management team at Fortune 200 companies, the most 
frequently cited way to avoid scandals is through selecting the right leaders. The conventional 
thinking goes that through selecting leaders who are persons of the utmost integrity, firms win 
the battle before it even has to be fought.  Interestingly, this is one case where the theory of the 
practitioners may not meet the reality of their practice.   




 Many organizations have implemented “competency models” for the selection and 
development of their organizational leaders. These models specify the competencies, defined 
as the knowledge, skills, behaviors, and other characteristics that effective leaders must 
possess.  Such competency profiles guide the selection (some competencies must be 
possessed by an individual before s/he can be hired or promoted) and development (some 
competencies will be proactively developed in individuals by the organization designing a series 
of training and development experiences). Given the preponderance of competency 
profiles/models in organizations, and the prevailing view that these scandals are due to “a few 
bad apples” (i.e., selection mistakes), one would expect to see “honesty/integrity” as one of the 
most popular competencies. 
However, as part of a best practice benchmarking process, CAHRS research assistants 
conducted interviews with HR leaders at 21 Fortune 200 companies to learn about their 
leadership development processes (Sovina, Wherry, & Stepp, 2003).  All were companies that 
self-nominated, because they believed that they possessed world class leadership development 
systems.  As part of the research process, 19 companies provided CAHRS with their leadership 
competency models.  Again, if selection of leaders were key to avoiding scandals, one would 
have expected to see all 19 companies with “Honesty” or “Integrity” as leadership 
competencies.  In reality, only two listed these characteristics as competencies.   
One defense offered when confronted with these results is that honesty/integrity are not 
really competencies to be selected for, but part of the firms’ core values. Interestingly, this 
defense often comes from individuals who previously stated that “selecting the right leaders” 
prevents the problem, but then are confronted with the fact that their rhetoric does not match 
their organizational reality. However, if honesty/integrity is one of the core values, to what extent 
is this value given weight in the selection and development of organizational leaders?  Is it 
possible that the executives now accused of wrongdoing lived saintly lives right up until the last 
minute that they suddenly decided to exploit their companies? Or is it more possible that these 




individuals had track records that might have led astute observers to believe that, under the 
right circumstance, these individuals would carelessly disregard any moral compunction for their 
own personal gain? Whether honesty/integrity comprises a competency or core value is less 
important than trying to examine the kinds of characteristics that might be risk factors leading to 
dishonest behavior 
One could never hope to develop an exhaustive list of characteristics of 
dishonest/dishonorable individuals. Therefore, the ones I offer here provide only a starting point 
for the larger discussion. However, while not exhaustive, I think that few would argue that 
individuals who (a) lack a moral compass, (b) possess excessive selfishness or greed, and/or 
(c) have immense egos are ones who may be particularly prone to engaging in behavior that 
ends up in scandal. 
While the phrase “lacking a moral compass” may seem ambiguous, it need not be.  One 
need not agree on the exact moral system (a topic to which I will return later), to believe that 
individuals without a firm moral system present a serious risk of engaging in immoral behavior.  
Individuals who firmly believe in certain things being right and wrong must at least implicitly 
compare their behavior to their self-imposed standards. This does not preclude unethical 
behavior, because having fought the conflict, they may still succumb to selfish motivation and 
violate the system.  
Those who have not grappled with developing an internal set of moral standards, 
however, will have no fight. They can be expected to do what benefits them because they have 
no other standards by which to judge the outcome of their behavior. An era increasingly 
dominated by post-modern philosophy (there is no objective truth) and situational ethics (the 
rightness/wrongness of any behavior depends upon the situation) can serve as an impediment 
to the development of an internal system of standards. In fact, in response to Bill Pollard’s 
address (Pollard, 2003), one HR executive stated “In today’s global world, how can anyone be 




so naïve as to think that there is one right and wrong.” That worldview can be used to ultimately 
justify any behavior. 
Second, as noted above, excessive selfishness and greed often form the foundational 
motivation underlying dishonesty and a lack of integrity. Gordon Gecko in the movie “Wall 
Street” gives an impassioned defense of greed, arguing that “greed is good” because it 
motivates individuals toward progress, and companies toward competitive success. Many have 
attributed such thinking to Adam Smith, the founder of basic economic philosophy of capitalism.  
While Smith argued that individuals seeking to benefit themselves in the market results in the 
“invisible hand” that brings economic progress, by no means did he ever aspire to unbridled 
greed.  
In his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments he wrote “The perfectly virtuous man 
desires not only to be loved, but to be lovely…not only praise, but praiseworthiness…To feel 
much for others and little for ourselves,…to restrain our selfish and to indulge our benevolent 
affections constitutes the perfection of human nature,” (Smith, 1790).  Certainly his philosophy 
argued for a system in which individuals pursued their self interests within the confines of a 
deep moral code. In essence, our capitalist system depends on individuals who seek to better 
their standing through meeting the needs and desires of others, but greed, opportunism, and 
selfishness exist when individuals seek to meet their own needs and desires at the expense of 
others.       
Finally, immense egos proliferate among top executives.  How can one reach the zenith 
of their organizational career and not feel they must possess “what is takes” to a greater extent 
than all those below?  Whether ego is the driver that enables executives to reach the top, or the 
outcome of having reached it, such ego can result in catastrophic consequences.  Egotism 
refers to an over high opinion of oneself. It can result in executives feeling they “deserve” 
whatever they can get. It clouds their ability to listen to negative feedback or contrary opinions.  
Under either of these conditions, they may be prone toward seeking and justifying maximum 




individual outcomes in spite of the consequences to others.  It can also lead them to believe that 
“fudging the numbers” in the current month or quarter is fine, because they will bring the 
organization back the next month or next quarter.     
What is HR to do? Most HR executives would adhere, at least in part, to the “bad 
apples” theory of corruption.  If so, they bear an inescapable burden to expand the firm’s ability 
to assess potential risk factors.  One option would be to look for behavioral indicators that would 
serve as “red flags” for current or potential future leaders. 
For instance, an individual who repeatedly lies to others would certainly be called into 
question.  However, what kind of lies matter? For instance, individuals who lie about their 
academic degree or work history are often terminated immediately. How about individuals who 
lie on expense reports? Fudged reports, although they may not result in huge monetary losses, 
certainly indicate that the individual has exploited his or her employer for personal gain.  Or, 
even more interestingly, how about individuals who are engaged in extra-marital affairs? Often 
firms argue that this is irrelevant because this behavior does not impact the firm. However, an 
equally valid argument can be made that individuals who lie to the objects of their deepest oaths 
cannot be expected to tell the truth to those to whom they have lesser commitments. 
A second group of indicators evidencing an excessive focus on money, power, or self 
might also provide warnings.  For instance, individuals who engage in constant self-promotion 
over others might be prone to later promoting themselves over the organization.  Individuals 
with poor credit histories, or even more importantly, poor present credit conditions (excessive 
debt beyond what reasonable income could support) may lead to a situation where the 
individual is tempted to engage in unethical behavior. Such situations may develop when an 
executive’s lifestyle rises to a level supported by tremendous returns from stock options, only to 
later find the stock options underwater.  Finally, how an individual treats subordinates may 
provide insight into his or her character.  When executives treat assistants or direct reports as 




servants who are obligated to fulfill their every desire, one can expect that it will not be long 
before they feel the same way about shareholders.   
This does not mean that individuals with such indicators should never be hired or 
promoted. In fact one SVPHR described his previous CEO as having a long and constant track 
record of extramarital affairs, yet having been an outstanding business leader.  The key is to 
know that such an individual needs a strong set of external controls to ensure that this character 
does not spill over into business decision making. These indicators can be considered risk 
factors: they do not indicate dishonesty or a lack of integrity, but the do indicate potential risk. 
In sum, HR must devote considerably more wide-eyed effort and attention to assessing 
the honesty and integrity of organizational decision makers.  In some cases these assessments 
may lead to termination, or failure to promote. In other cases, they may lead to additional 
controls.  However, assessments must be thorough, ongoing, and in all aspects of an 
individual’s life.  It is hard to believe that the top executives who are now suspected, indicted, or 
convicted of illegal behavior (a) have been brazen liars cheats, and/or thieves for their entire 
careers (it’s just that no one noticed?) or even (b) sat down and consciously thought “I think I’ll 
break a big law today?”  Budha wrote “Do not think lightly of evil, saying ‘It will not come to me.’ 
By the constant fall of water drops a pitcher is filled; likewise, the unwise person, accumulating 
evil little by little, becomes full of evil.”  Similarly, bad apples were probably not always bad. 
Rather as they constantly brushed up against the legal and ethical boundaries, they probably 
woke up one morning (awakened by the SEC!), to find that they had crossed it without knowing. 
HR professionals need to keep these executives from getting close to the boundaries, and 
speak up as soon as they cross them.  
The Incentives 
Many have attributed the dysfunctional behavior of top executives to the presence of 
heavy stock option packages.  One of the most consistently demonstrated research findings in 
the social science literature is the proposition that tying pay to performance results in higher 




performance on the performance dimension to which pay is tied.  However, many have noted 
that tying pay to performance often has unintended, and sometimes dysfunctional 
consequences. 
 The growth of stock options as a percentage of executive compensation increased 
substantially over the past decade. Stock options tie executive pay to increases in shareholder 
wealth as defined by the stock price.  Consequently, such pay systems have been advocated as 
a means through which the interests of executives and shareholders can be aligned.  In 
addition, with the dot.com boom, many start-up companies offered stock options in lieu of large 
cash compensation, presenting potential employees with the possibility of accruing significant 
wealth.  Older, more traditional companies increased their use of stock options in efforts to 
minimize the flight of talent to these dot.coms.   
 While stock options resulted in some alignment with shareholders, and led to the 
creation of a number of millionaires, they also led to some unintended consequences. For 
instance, many of the millionaires capitalized on the “bubble” as stock prices inflated far beyond 
their true value.  However, once the bubble burst, the retention value of the options disappeared 
as well.   
In addition, options focused executive behavior on the stock price as the ultimate metric 
by which they would be judged.  This led to two additional unintended consequences. First, it 
put analysts in the position of becoming the supreme arbiters of company performance, and 
made pleasing the analysts one of the highest priorities.  If analysts sought revenue growth over 
profits (which they did), then companies needed to produce revenue growth. Traditionally “Most 
Admired” corporations could produce revenue and earnings growth in low double digits and be 
penalized at the expense of start-ups producing exponential revenue growth while incurring 
fantastic losses.   
Consider the criticisms Merck has faced over their decision to book co-payments to 
pharmacies as revenues.  Note that the payments were also noted as expenses, thus having no 




impact on profits.  Note also that accounting rules consider the practice legitimate and many of 
Merck’s competitors engaged in the same accounting practices.  However, when analysts 
reward revenue growth over profits, then such a practice would seem logical because it could 
produce significant revenues by simply changing accounting practices.   
Second, it provided an incentive to manipulate accounting statements to hide any 
potential numbers that might displease the analysts.  For instance, Bill Macy, Professor of Law 
at Cornell University, notes that in 1998, an MBA student group in an accounting class at the 
Johnson School of Management was assigned the Enron books to examine. As one part of their 
assignment they performed a Beneish analysis which combines a number of financial indicators 
to reveal the possibility that a firms is engaging in earnings manipulations. These MBA students 
calculated a Beneish score of -1.89, indicating a high probability that Enron was manipulating 
earnings (Ghosh, Ocampo, Harris, Simpson, Kruger, and Vaidhyanathan, 1998). Subsequent 
post-mortems have demonstrated the accuracy of these students’ analyses. 
 Stock compensation also resulted in an additional outcome: extremely high levels of pay.  
While wealth creation is the engine that moves capitalist economies, one must also recognize 
the potential dysfunctional consequences.  One would like to think that as people make more 
money, it becomes less important to them. However, evidence suggests the contrary; the more 
people make, the more they focus on making more.  For instance, Daniel Vasella, CEO of 
Novartis stated in Fortune magazine, “The strange part is, the more I made, the more I got 
preoccupied with money. When suddenly I didn’t have to think about money as much, I found 
myself starting to think increasingly about it. Money corrupts the mind.” (Vasella & Leaf, 2002) 
 Was Vasella correct? Consider its impact on Dennis Kozlowski: 
“The oddest aspect of Kozlowski’s conduct, for those of us naïve enough to think that people take 
money because they somehow need it, is that he began availing himself of what became hundreds 
of millions of dollars in company loans…precisely at the moment that his pay was 
exploding…Kozlowski began regularly taking loans in 1996 and 1997 – just as his board approved 
compensation leaped from $8.8 million to $52.8. It wasn’t until ’98 and ’99 though, that he really 
went hog-wild on the borrowing. Apparently his approved compensation of $136.1 in 1999 left him 
in a cash squeeze.” (Varchaver, 2002). 




 Finally, what about the “spinning of IPO’s” that has recently come to light.  Under such 
arrangements, CEO’s and other top managers received access to IPO’s from the investment 
banks with which they did business.  I often ask HR executives if their firm has a policy 
regarding procurement managers limiting them to receiving gifts valued at no more than $25 or 
$50, and have yet to find a company without such policy.  Yet, top executives at some of these 
companies were able to receive preferred IPO access worth potentially millions of dollars from 
the suppliers of capital. HR executives lamely defend this practice, stating that this was the 
CEO’s own personal wealth, as if a supplier providing such benefits (maybe providing stock at 
below market prices) to a purchasing agent would be considered legitimate. 
 What is HR to do?  Understanding HR’s role in executive compensation should be 
obvious.  Competent HR professionals have the best knowledge of the impact of incentives, 
both functional and dysfunctional, relative to anyone else in the firm. Yet, given the prevalence 
of these scandals or even more recent negative press (e.g., Airline executives huge “retention” 
packages provided at the same time they were demanding unions to take significant wage cuts), 
one would think (or at least hope) that HR was nowhere to be found.  
For instance, we know that tying pay to any performance measure will have the potential 
for dysfunctional consequences, so why would stock based compensation be any different?  Did 
the vast amounts of money made by executives and pilloried by the press ever appear on the 
radar screens of HR as something that may potentially distort decision making?  Did HR 
executives somehow see a moral distinction between a purchaser receiving $100 in gifts from a 
supplier and a CEO receiving $100,000 from an investment bank? 
The point is not that stock-based compensation should be eliminated, that executive pay 
is too high, or that CEO’s should be precluded from earning any outside income. However, it 
appears that in most cases, these questions were never even asked.  HR executives seemed 
either bought off (with huge pay packages of their own), implicitly threatened (with discharge for 
resisting these pay packages) or ignorant. None of these alternatives are particularly flattering. 




However, this highlights the importance of HR professionals who possess the competence to 
understand all the consequences of incentive systems, and the courage to speak up.    
The Controls 
 Critics also cite a lack of controls as an important cause of the current crisis in trust.  
They argue that accountants and boards did not exhibit sufficient oversight, and in some cases 
may have been complicit with the executives.  
 Obviously the conflict created by accounting firms extending their businesses into 
consulting created potential internal conflicts, and such conflicts may have contributed to the 
demise of Arthur Andersen. One HR executive within the firm (who wishes to remain 
anonymous for obvious reasons) suggested that one could feel the culture within the company 
change as consulting fees became a larger and larger percentage of revenues.  He stated that 
without anyone every explicitly encouraging, or anyone necessarily consciously deciding, the 
accounting professionals within the firm became more and more focused on generating 
consulting fees. From the outside, some have suggested that revenues generated from 
consulting and auditing at Enron was such a small percentage of AA’s worldwide revenues, that 
they could not have encouraged auditors to overlook questionable practices. However, one 
must recognize that these revenues were the overwhelming percentage of revenues generated 
by the Houston office of AA.   
 Similarly, conflicting incentives also seemed to plague Boards of Directors at some of 
the companies marred by the recent scandals.  Board members of Adelphi Communications 
were considered by some to be hand picked by the Rigas family.  Tyco was paying one of its 
Board members for facilitating an acquisition.  Finally, the problem of interlocking boards 
(situations where executives sit on one another’s boards) has long been criticized by those 
interested in good corporate governance.   
 What is HR to do?  Obviously, the choice and management of auditors and tax 
consultants is not something that was ever on the radar screens of top HR executives. In 




addition, some HR executives have little say over the choice of board members. However, these 
scandals should provide adequate incentives for HR to expand its view of where it should be 
involved.  Who within the organization better understands incentives, and how such incentives 
can create conflicts? Just as they should have noted the internal conflicts between analysts and 
investment bankers within their firms, they should be best able to identify potential conflicting 
incentives within different units of their suppliers.  
 In addition, HR certainly has become more involved in the selection of board members.  
Their focus for the future must be not just on the competence of the members, but those 
potential members’ relational networks.  One certainly could not have as a member of a 
compensation committee a CEO on whose compensation committee their firm’s CEO sits.  One 
would also have to be cautious of having any board members on whose board its own top 
managers sit.  Finally, HR can play a lead role in directing the processes for board functioning.  
Many firms have gone to evaluating boards and board members. Many have begun requiring or 
subsidizing board members to receive training. Many have moved to having chances for the 
boards to meet without managers present.  Again, the competencies of top HR executives such 
as team building, group processes, selection, training, performance management, etc. are all 
critical to an effectively functioning board.  Consequently, HR’s role must expand to include 
these activities at the board, not just the organization level. 
The System 
 Another potential cause of the current crisis was “the system,” i.e., the current system 
where investment analysts provide ratings of company stocks, and consequently hold extreme 
power over executive decision making.  Certainly analysts serve an important and necessary 
function within our capital markets. They are able to aggregate and synthesize reams of data 
practically unavailable to the common investor and provide that common investor with guidance.  
However, while their function is useful, we might consider the criteria they use that has driven 
considerable company decision making.  




 In essence, analysts consider a number of factors in providing recommendations. 
However, one important aspect is their tendency to reward and or punish companies’ stock 
price based on quarterly earnings, particularly meeting earnings expectations, growing earnings, 
and consistent growth of earnings.  Without a doubt attempts to meet quarterly earnings 
expectations has resulted in significant manipulations of earnings.  Companies book sales, 
expenses, acquisitions, divestitures, etc. in one quarter vs. another often solely based on how it 
will impact that quarter’s earnings.  These earnings reports are further manipulated to ensure 
that the earnings appear to be consistent (i.e., the same from quarter to quarter within a year) 
and growing (from year to year).  
This system creates problems because company performance in the real world seldom 
reflects consistency from quarter to quarter, and may not always grow.  While over time, the 
short term temporal manipulations often wash out, they certainly have an “inoculation” effect in 
teaching executives that such manipulations are a legitimate business practice.  What happens 
when performance declines in one quarter? Executives may manipulate the earnings with the 
assumption that they will make it up the next quarter. However, if the next quarter falters, and 
the quarter after that, soon these reports are not innocent manipulations, but fraud. Note that 
the executives may never have meant to engage in fraud, but the system has inoculated them 
from seeing the problems, and continued engagement in minor manipulations then inadvertently 
leads to illegality. In fact, again, Daniel Vasella stated, “Once you get under the domination of 
making the quarter – even unwittingly – you start to compromise in the gray area of the 
business, that wide swath of terrain between the top and bottom lines.” (Vasella & Leaf, 2002). 
In addition, as noted before, the system encourages top executives to tell the analysts 
what they want to hear. Being human, too, analysts can make the same errors in human 
judgment (being duped, overly impressed, failing to see what they did not want to see, etc.) as 
any other person. Enron was a rising star because their information-rich, e-business, 
deregulation, whole-new-way-of-trading-energy business model impressed analysts.  Analysts 




were so impressed that Enron’s stock ratings soared in spite of the fact that the future fall was 
available for anyone to predict. Returning to our Cornell MBA students, we find that in 1998, 
using the same numbers available to the analysts, they issued a definite “sell” recommendation, 
noting that in 1997 “net income available to common fell 85%,” (Ghosh et al., 1998). Again, 
these same publicly available numbers suggested that Enron was engaged in earnings 
manipulations, yet not a single one flagged Enron as a risk at that time.  In other words, honest, 
independent amateurs seemed better able to police the capital markets than sophisticated, but 
conflicted professionals. 
What is HR to do? Can HR change the entire market system, as it exists today? 
Certainly not.  However, who in the organization is better skilled at understanding incentives and 
their impact on human behavior?  An astute HR executive should be able to identify the 
pressures facing top executives, see the impact of these pressures on decision making, and 
hold the mirror up to them so that they can understand how these pressures may undermine the 
effectiveness of their decision making.  They need to be socially sensitive enough to see when 
top managers are implicitly giving orders that they would never make explicit and courageous 
enough to call it out. Finally, and most importantly, they will provide tremendous value when 
they can provide “a way out” for top executives, be it the refusal to provide earnings guidance, 
working with board members and/or analysts to understand that honest earnings should trump 
consistent earnings, or simply being the support for the CEO who decides to buck the system in 
the name of integrity. 
The Additional Role of HR: Integrity Officer 
 The traditional roles of strategic partner, employee advocate, administrative expert, and 
change agent have not disappeared, nor will they decrease in importance. However, these 
scandals undoubtedly added to these current responsibilities one of serving as an integrity 
officer. Some firms have often used HR professional as their ethics or compliance officers, but 
this new role goes beyond a simple structural arrangement. Top HR executives must actively 




and constantly analyze the environment faced by top decision makers. They must accurately 
identify the pressures and incentives that could encourage these decision makers to put self-
interest above the organization’s interests.  They must consistently assess the evolving 
character of decision makers, recognizing that individuals who had high integrity, and may still 
aspire to high integrity, can slowly, and incrementally slide down a path of destruction. They 
must expand the focus of relevant organizational actors beyond internal executives to include 
auditors, consultants, investment bankers, and board members, and be on constant vigil to spot 
potential conflicts of interest. Most importantly, at the first hint of dishonest behavior, HR 
executives must have the confidence and courage to explicitly and specifically put it on the table 
for top managers and/or the board to see. 
 Interestingly, many executives refer to the HR function as serving a role as the 
“conscience” of the organization. While a “conscience” should infiltrate all organizational 
members rather than be isolated in one function, certainly HR professionals must take this role 
seriously. Such a role creates a conflict that the field must recognize and to which it must 
respond.   
Top HR executives are most often hired and fired by the CEO. When HR executives 
serve at the pleasure of those they may be called upon to call out, they cannot be sufficiently 
independent to be expected to do so.  Consequently, this may call for exploring changes in the 
employment relationship of top HR executives. Perhaps HR executives should have a direct 
reporting relationship to the board of directors. Or, maybe their employment contracts should 
include significant golden parachutes for top HR executives who are fired for effectively playing 
this “conscience” role.  The point here is not to suggest the perfect answer, but to recognize that 
all of the issues discussed above as potential causes of CEO misbehavior can similarly 
characterize the situations of HR executives. Consequently, as the field seeks to play a role in 
designing systems to encourage honest behavior in CEO’s, it must simultaneously examine its 
own situation to ensure that these systems cannot be circumvented.  





No one can blame the problems that have resulted in the current crisis of trust on HR. 
Clearly, bad apples, with incentives to do bad things, functioning under inadequate controls, and 
working within a flawed system resulted in the problems we see today.  HR did not cause this 
problem. 
However, to say that HR did not cause the problem does not absolve HR from 
responsibility.  Many of the pieces to this puzzle seemed obvious before the scandals; the 
scandals simply put the pieces together.  Now with the puzzle solved, we can only expect that 
new pieces will be added. HR executives must be diligent to seek out these pieces, try to put 
them together, and create the puzzle solution before the next crisis breaks. It will require greater 
proactivity, diligence, and courage that has been evidenced in the past. 
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